Negligence: Religious Societies; Charities by Graham, Fred J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 December 1930 Article 9
Negligence: Religious Societies; Charities
Fred J. Graham
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Fred J. Graham, Negligence: Religious Societies; Charities, 15 Marq. L. Rev. 54 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol15/iss1/9
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
strued to the effect of a repeal of the common law, the common law
rule of requiring the dismissal of an officer for cause to be served with
notice of a hearing, is to prevail in this state. And since this rule was
not observed in the dismissal of the three fire commissioners in the
case under comment, such removal was unauthorized and left no
vacancies which the mayor might fill with new appointes.
If every new mayor on coming into office would be permitted to
dismiss officers without cause, efficiency and merit in many instances
would be the least of qualifications for such offices. Rather, would
political alliance and personal friendship play a greater role. Such a
situation is always to be avoided and the courts of Wisconsin are par-
ticularly cognizant of the mischief such complete power in an official
might result and invariably rule against it.
Miss ELISHEVA IUSHEWITZ.
Negligence: Religious Societies, Charities.
Plaintiff attends a luncheon given by a church society in the base-
ment of the church. Leaving early, the plaintiff proceeds down a hall-
way that is so dimly lighted that she fails to see the outer steps, falls.
down them, and sustains injuries. She sues the church. The above
facts appearing in the complaint. Defendant demure on the ground
that: (1) Plaintiff was merely a licensee and cannot recover because
complaint fails to allege that defendant was guilty of active negligence,
or maintained a trap upon the premises; (2) Plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law in proceeding down and im-
properly lighted hall; (3) The doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply to cases where the 'superior" is a charitable organization as
in this case. The demurrer was sustained in the Circuit Court; over-
ruled in the Supreme Court. 230 N. W. 708.
The Supreme Court disposed of the defendant's grounds for de-
murrer in the order mentioned above. They will be so discussed in the
following paragraphs.
It is of course elementary that a licensor owes no duty to a licensee
other than refraining from active negligence or setting a trap for him,
144 Wis., 614. This principle is so well settled that it requires no
further citation of authority. Upon the face of it, then, defendant's
contention seems well taken; but he (as well as the plaintiff) over-
looked the so-called "Safe Statute," which provides in 101.01 (12)
that every building as a place of assemblage is a public building. The
church being used for such purposes, was therefore a public building
within the meaning of the statute. Section .06 of the same chapter
(101) provides that the owner of a public building must maintain it
in such a way as to render it safe for the frequenters thereof. The
NOTES AND COMMENT
court held in this case that the plaintiff was- in the class of a "fre-
quenter" and therefore the defendent owed her the duty of safe main-
tenance imposed upon it by 101.06. Needless to say a hallway that is
so improperly lighted that a person cannot see a stairway at the end
of it is not being maintained in a safe condition. So defendant's first
contention is disposed of to his disadvantage.,
We now consider the question of plaintiffs' contributory negligence.
The court did not waste any time in disposing of this contention. It
followed the rule that it had previously laid down in 204 N. W. 250,
providing flatly that proceeding down an unlighted starway in a pub-
lic building does not constitute contributory negligence, but merely an
assumption of risk that is not a defense. It follows therefore niat pro-
ceeding down a dimly lighted hall does not constitute contributory
negligence.
Defendant further contended that the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior does not apply where, as here, the 'superior' is a charitable organ-
ization. Under the general law of the land, defendant"s contention is
correct. Innumerable cases hold that a religious corporation is a char-
itable organization, 125 N. E. 13; 123 N. E. 289; 209 S. W. 104; 264
Penn., 77. The courts also agree that a charitable organization is not
liable for personal injuries caused by the negligence of its servants or
agents, 119 N. E. 686; 191 N. W. 751 Wis. 178; and 88 S. E. 649
holds that the rule excepting charitable institutions from liability for
torts of their agents or servants is an exception to the rule of respond-
ent superior. So far the general law favors the defendant, but again
the court applies the "Safe Statute" to completely blast his argu-
ments. The court points out that 101.01 (12) and 101.06 (supra)
apply to all public buildings alike, be they owned by charitable organ-
izations or not; and the former as well as the latter must maintain
their public buildings in a safe condition or respond in damages ta
those injured due to the organization's failure to so maintain them.
Thus the Wisconsin "Safe Statute" imposes upon charitable or-
ganizations an obligation which they never before had-that of the
safe maintenance of their public buildings.
FRED J. GRAHAM.
Negligence:
Plaintiff, while in the act of leaving defendant's store after making
a few purchases, slipped and fell in one of the aisles and broke her
arm. Plaintiff seeks recovery on the mere relationship of invitor and
invitee, alleging negligence on the part of the invitor or his employees
solely on the existence of the alleged spot on the floor. HELD.-The
store owner is merely under the duty of exercising reasonable care to
keep the store in safe condition for the customers. F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Williams, 41 Fed. Rep. 970.
